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Note
When A Permissive Intervenor Impairs
The Plaintiff's Control
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the plaintiff considerable power over the lawsuit and facilitate joinder and intervention.
These policies can give rise to a conflict. An original party to an action
may find himself foreclosed from joining additional parties simply because an intervenor who has already been added to the action presents
a jurisdictional barrier. This Note explores one such situation: when a
federal court grants a motion for permissive intervention in a diversity
action, and the plaintiff later seeks to permissively join a party who is
adverse to, and shares citizenship with, the already admitted permissive
intervenor. Most federal plaintiffs do not encounter this problem, but
those who do face a serious jurisdictional dilemma.
The following hypothetical will be used to illustrate the conflict.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Nevada, sues defendant, a citizen of California, in
the federal district court of California. Subject matter jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship, and complete diversity is required.
Intervenor, a citizen of Oregon, is allowed to permissively intervene as
a plaintiff in the action under rule 24(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' The Nevada plaintiff then seeks to amend the complaint
under rule 15(a) to permissively join a second defendant, a citizen of
intervenor nor
Oregon, under the provisions of rule 20(a). Neither the
2
the defendant to be joined is an indispensable party.
This Note addresses the original plaintiff's power to manage this
suit and the procedural and jurisdictional limitations on such power
with respect to joinder of additional parties and permissive intervention. The principles regarding the plaintiffs power to control the action when joining a party, the intervenor's rights as a party, and
diversity jurisdiction are then applied to the hypothetical posed above.
The Note concludes that while the original Nevada plaintiff should not
be able to join the additional Oregon defendant, the procedural tools of
1. All references to rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The rules are reprinted at 28 U.S.C. app. 515-677 (1982).
2. The presence of indispensable parties in an action requires the court to apply rule
19, and presents entirely different considerations than does the permissive addition of parties, the sole issue considered in this Note. See infra notes 11, 20, 25.
[707]
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severance and consolidation can be used to satisfy the needs of the vari-

ous parties.
The Plaintiff's Power to Shape the Suit
Traditionally, the party who initiates an action controls the litigation.3 The courts generally adhere to the notion that those who seek a
forum should be protected from the actions of other claimants. 4 One
line of cases suggests that the plaintiff's right to proceed should not be
defeated by subsequent joinder or intervention without the plaintiff's
consent. 5 It has been argued that a party who is first in time, like the
plaintiff in the hypothetical, should enjoy preference over a plaintiff
who files later,6 such as the intervenor.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defer to the plaintiff in several ways. For example, rule 24(b)(2) requires the court to consider
undue delay or prejudice to the original parties when deciding a motion for permissive intervention,7 as well as the plaintiff's opposition to
such a motion." The court also has the power to transfer an action at

the plaintiff's request instead of dismissing it for failure to satisfy procedural requirements. 9 Rule 15(a) allows plaintiffs to amend their plead-

3. See McCoid, A Single PackageforMultipartyDisputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707, 71314 (1976); see also Friedenthal, IncreasedParticioationby Non Parties:The Need/or Limitations and Conditions, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 259, 262 (1980) (an individual plaintiff "should be
given every fair chance to control his own suit").
4. "A plaintiff ordinarily is free to decide who shall be parties to his lawsuit." Simpson v. Providence Washington Ins. Group, 608 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1979). See also
McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24, 38 (E.D. Cal. 1974) (plaintiff has traditional prerogative of choosing the parties to litigation absent countervailing concerns such as
rule 19). See generally Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,Agencies, and
Arbitrators, 81 HARv. L. REv. 721 (1968) (litigation rights of an intervenor need not be as
full as the rights of original parties).
5. See American Bowling Supply Co. v. Al Martin, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D. Kan.
1951). Cf. Johnson v. Riverland Levee Dist., 117 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1941). In Johnson and
American Bowling Supply a nondiverse party attempted to permissively intervene. In Johnson, the plaintiff consented and the court no longer had jurisdiction of the entire case. Johnson, 117 F.2d at 715. InAmerican Bowling Supply, the plaintiff did not consent, the court
refused the motion, and jurisdiction was maintained. American Bowling Supply, 96 F. Supp.
at 36-37.
6. See Theis, Younger v. Harris:Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 111
(1981).
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(b)(2). See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Keizer Equip. Co., 433 F.2d 654
(6th Cir. 1970) (petition denied where the moving party had continuously known of the
action for eight years and the petition was fied near the end of an eighteen day trial).
8. See National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 425 F. Supp. 1365, 137273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 207 F. Supp.
252, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
9. See Lamar v. American Basketball Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 1198, 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(transferring an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) when court improperly joined a defendant
over whom the court lacked in personam jurisdiction and venue).
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ings, once as a matter of right and thereafter at the discretion of the
court. 10 With respect to permissive joinder," l this rule permits the original plaintiff to assert a claim under rule 20(a) against any additional
parties that can be joined, if the claim arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the original claim and the claims
of all parties so
2
joined share common questions of law or fact.'
Of course, there are limits on the plaintiff's right to shape the lawsuit. Except for the first, motions for leave to amend a pleading under
rule 15(a) are committed to the court's discretion.13 When the amend14
ment would join a party through rule 20(a), the court must consider
15
judicial economy and trial convenience, the motives of the moving
party, 16 delay or prejudice, 17 the effect of the joinder on jurisdiction
10. Rule 15(a) states in pertinent part:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served. . . . Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
11. Permissive joinder is to be distinguished procedurally, but not jurisdictionally,
from compulsory joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication, which is governed by
rule 19. See, e.g., 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 19.01[l] (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as MOoRE's].
12. Rule 20(a) states in pertinent part:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons...
may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
13. "[T]he leave [to amend] sought should. . . be 'freely given.' Of course, the grant
or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court." Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
14. See Martinez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 446 (N.D. Cal. 1975); see also
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (Court enumerated factors to consider when exercising discretion under rule 15 that are similar to those discussed for rule 20). See infra notes
15-19 & accompanying text.
15. See League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914,
917 (9th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Davis, 464 F. Supp. 458, 460-61 (D.D.C. 1978); Anderson v.
Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 711 (D. Minn. 1968).
16. See Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th
Cir. 1980); see also Shaw v. Munford, 526 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court
found no evidence that plaintiff's motive in joining parties that destroyed diversity was to
deprive the federal court of jurisdiction); Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 506 F. Supp. 302, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no evidence additional defendants joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction);
Gonzalez v. Leonard, 497 F. Supp. 1058, 1076-77 (D. Conn. 1980) (joinder disfavored that
would only result in numerous motions to dismiss).
17. See Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th
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over the action,18 and the ability of the court to provide complete relief 19 Moreover, the federal rules were drafted and are construed to

allow many parties into the litigation, 20 thereby reducing the plaintiffs

control. The rules governing intervention, joinder, indispensable par-

ties, and class actions all circumscribe either the plaintiffs ability to
join parties or to keep parties out of the litigation.

A second source of limitations is subject matter jurisdiction, the

power of a court to hear a case.2 1 The plaintiff, having chosen the fo-

rum, cannot complain if the limited jurisdiction of that court prohibits
certain subsequent amendments of the original complaint to add par-

ties.22 For example, a plaintiffs consent to intervention by parties who
do not independently meet the requirements of subject matter jurisdic-

tion may result in the loss of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs original
Cir. 1980);see also Shaw v. Munford, 526 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gonzalez
v. Leonard, 497 F. Supp. 1058, 1076-77 (D. Conn. 1980); Miller v. Davis, 464 F. Supp. 458,
461 (D.D.C. 1978).
18. See Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th
Cir. 1980); see also Reynolds v. Wabash R.R., 236 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1956); Thorp v. Petrola,
81 F.R.D. 513 (N.D. W. Va. 1979).
19. See League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914,
917 (9th Cir. 1977); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 929 (1964).
20. "Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is
strongly encouraged." United Mine Workers v. Gibb, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). See
Goldberg, The Influence of ProceduralRules on FederalJurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395,
416-24, 469-76 (1976); Jones, Problems and Prospects of Participationin Affirmative Action
Litigation:A Rolefor Intervenors, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 221, 223-24 (1980).
The addition of an indispensable third party may limit the plaintifi's control over the
action. See supra note 11. However, a party who does not qualify as an indispensable party
under rule 19(b) may be dropped from an action to preserve diversity under rule 21. RalllConey, Inc. v. Gates, 528 F.2d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 1976); Nash v. Hall, 436 F. Supp. 633, 63435 (W.D. Okla. 1977). This principle does not address this Note's hypothetical case as
neither the intervenor nor the defendant to be joined are indispensable.
21. See Ford v. Valmal Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1974). See generallv
13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522
(1975 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
22. "A plaintiff cannot complain if [federal jurisdiction] does not encompass all of his
possible claims. . . since it is he who has chosen the federal rather than the state forum and
must thus accept its limitations." Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376
(1978). In a state such as California, the plaintiff in the hypothetical case would have personal jurisdiction to the extent allowable by the United States Constitution, and presumably
could sue both defendants in state court without the restrictions of diversity jurisdiction. By
choosing the federal forum the plaintiff has consented to certain limits on his power over the
action. In Owen Equipment the Court specifically addressed the plaintiff's power to amend
her other pleadings. "Thus it is clear that the [plaintiff] could not originally have brought
suit in Federal Court naming [nondiverse, adverse parties] .... Yet the identical lawsuit
resulted when she amended her complaint. Complete diversity was destroyed just as surely
as if she had sued [the nondiverse party] initially." Id. at 374. The same reasoning should
apply to the facts of the hypothetical.
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action as well as the denial of the intervention. 23 In addition, if a plaintiff amends a complaint based on diversity jurisdiction to raise claims
24
against nondiverse parties, the court will no longer have jurisdiction.

Permissive Intervention
Permissive intervention is governed by rule 24(b), which allows a

potential party to enter an existing action if the party's claim satisfies
certain requirements. Permissive intervention is subject to the discretion of the court, which must determine under rule 24(b)(2) that the
intervenor's claim or defense shares a common question of law or fact

with the original action and that granting
the petition will not prejudice
25

those parties already in the action.
If the common question of law or fact and prejudice requirements
are satisfied in favor of intervention, the court has discretion to consider a number of additional factors. Among these are the effect of
intervention on jurisdiction,2 6 the opposition of the original parties to
the intervention, 27 the effect of the intervention on other potential parties,2 8 and the motives of the intervenor.2 9 The court may also consider
the intervenor's proposed development of the underlying issues in the
case, 30 particularly those issues that are before the court but have not
23. The basis for the few holdings on this point is that the plaintiff consented to the
joinder of parties whose presence destroyed diversity, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction over the whole action. See Johnson v. Riverland Levee Dist., 117 F.2d 711, 715 (8th
Cir. 1941); Gaddis v. Junker, 27 F.2d 156, 158-59 (E.D. Tex. 1928); Forest Oil Co. v. Crawford, 101 F. 849, 852 (3rd Cir. 1900).
24. See Oppenheim v. Sterling, 368 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1011 (1967).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). Permissive intervention is to be distinguished from intervention of right, which is governed by rule 24(a). The latter does not require an independent
basis of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 955 (9th Cir.
1977). The intervenor of right has a strong interest in the litigation, and must show that the
litigation affects his or her interest regarding the "property or transaction which is the subject of the action," that "disposition of the action may. . . impair. . . his ability to protect
that interest, "and that this interest "is [in]adequately represented by existing parties." FED.
R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
26. See Reedsburg Bank v. Apollo, 508 F.2d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 1975); Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1951).
27. See cases cited supra note 8.
28. See Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1969) (admission of one intervenor
would, in fairness, require admission of 120 other defendants).
29. See Edmondson v. Nebraska, 383 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1967 (improper motive found
where petition had the earmarks of a sham); Gentry v. Hibernia Bank, 154 F. Supp. 62
(N.D. Cal. 1956) (flagrant attempt to avoid diversity requirements grounds for refusal of
petition).
30. See Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977).
Spangler discusses permissive intervention in some depth and includes a list of seven factors
to be considered. Id.
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been adequately addressed. 3 1 In weighing these considerations, the

in mind the underlying federal policy to promote
court must also bear
32

judicial economy.
Because a motion for permissive intervention is addressed to the
discretion of the court, 33 the court may limit the scope of the intervention 34 to serve the underlying purpose of the federal rules, which is to
secure a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination." 3 5 The court
may limit the intervention to issues already in the pleadings, 36 or may
condition the intervention on the acceptance of discovery conducted
before the intervention.37 The petition may be granted on the condition that the intervenor not request a jury trial.3 8 Furthermore, the
court may refuse to allow the intervenor to become a full adversary
party by restricting 39the intervenor's participation to the filing of an
amicus curiae brief.
The court must impose any limitations on the scope of an inter-

venor's participation in a suit before the petition is granted.40 Once the

31. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 79 F.R.D. 235, 244 (D.D.C. 1978)
(intervenor proposed more complete consideration of an issue material to the settlement of
the dispute that the original parties had not fully addressed).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
33. "Rule 24(b) necessarily vests broad discretion in the district court to determine the
fairest and most efficient method of handling a case with multiple parties and claims." Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. See Ionian Shipping Co. v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 191-92 (2d Cir.
1970) (noting that the conditions necessary to the efficient conduct of proceedings should be
applicable to permissive intervention); United States ex rel. Browne & Bryan Lumber Co. v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 303 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1962) (conditioning intervention on waiver of jury trial sustained), cited with approvalin Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
541 n. 15 (1970) (distinguishing Browne from situation in which intervention is allowed without conditions); Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 298 F. Supp. 288, 293-94 (E.D. La.
1969) (permissive intervention allowed subject to the condition that intervenors only address
certain issues and not reopen and question matters already decided by the court).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
36. See Brennan v. United Steelworkers of Am., 501 F. Supp. 912, 920 (W.D. Pa.
1980); Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 33 F.R.D. 353, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Cf.
Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Stewart-Warner Corp.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964))
(finding that limits on the intervenor cannot be so narrow as to exclude claims and defenses
of the intervenor that have a "sufficiently close relationship" to the underlying action).
37. See Carrol v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 33 F.R.D. 353, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
38. See United States ex rel Browne & Bryan Lumber Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co., 303 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1962), cited with approvalin Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 541 n.15 (1970).
39. See Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131, 135 (D. Minn. 1966); see also Brewer
v. Republic Steel Corp., 513 F.2d 1222, 1225 (6th Cir. 1975) (suggesting use of amicus curiae
brief).
40. See, e.g., In re First Colonial Corp., 544 F.2d 1291, 1297-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Baddock v. American Benefit Life Ins. Co., 431 U.S. 904 (1977) (an intervenor
"may appeal from an appealable order unless the intervention has been specially limited to
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petition is granted, the intervenor's rights as a party in the action vest
and cannot thereafter be restricted. 4' Thus, upon the grant of the petition, an intervenor has the rights of a full party, 42 and is to43be treated as
an original party in the subsequent course of the action.
It is this last point that creates the jurisdictional problem for the
plaintiff in the hypothetical. He has no recourse once the intervenor

becomes a full party. If the plaintiff is not able to anticipate or discover
the identity of the additional defendant he wants to join until after the
intervention is granted, obviously the court cannot take this conflict
into consideration when considering the merits of the intervenor's

petition.
The Requirement of Independent Subject Matter Jurisdiction for Joinder
and Intervention and the Plaintiff's Dilemma
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,44 and limitaforbid it"); In re Oceana Int'l, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See generally 3B
MOORE'S, supra note 11, %24.17[1].
41. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 n.15 (1970) (once intervention granted
generally, the right to a jury trial cannot be restricted); Wheeler v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 563 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1977); Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242, 1245
(9th Cir. 1969) (citing Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964)); Raylite Elec. Corp. v. Noma Elec. Corp., 170
F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1948); In re Oceana Int'l Inc., 49 F.R.D. 329, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See generally MOORE'S, supra note 11, 24.17[].
42. See MOORE'S, supra note 11, 24.16; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541
n.15 (1970) (one who has been granted general intervention could not be denied a right to
jury trial); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 1975) (intervenor has full rights under title VII of the Civil Rights Act); In re Rabbe, Glissman & Co.,
71 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (an intervenor is for all intents and purposes an original party).
43. See In re Rabbe, Glissman & Co., 71 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Two
other factors suggest that an intervenor, once allowed into an action, is a full party. First,
the intervenor is required to file pleadings with the petition for intervention, FED. R. Civ. P.
24(c), a requirement that only applies to parties under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 7-11 (requiring only parties to file pleadings); see also Hartley Pen Co.
v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 153 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Thus, once the petition is granted,
the party's pleadings become fully a part of the action.
Second, the history of procedural rules indicates that an intervenor should be granted
the rights of a full party. Before the enactment of the current federal rules, intervention was
governed by Equity Rule 37. Equity Rule 37 was intended to apply only to actions in equity
in the federal courts. Actions at law were governed by state procedure. However, the federal courts "were apt to term the intervention [to an action at law] an ancillary bill in equity"
and apply Equity Rule 37. 3B MooRES, supra note 11, 24.04. Equity Rule 37 stated that
an action in intervention was subordinated to the main action. The federal rules dropped
any reference to subordination, thus implying an intent not to make an action in intervention subordinate to the original action. See Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242, 1245
(9th Cir. 1969); Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 153 (S.D. Cal. 1954); 3B
MOORE'S, supra note 11,
24.04.
44. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).
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tions on the federal courts' power to hear cases must be strictly construed.45 Consequently, an independent basis of federal subject matter

jurisdiction must exist for the claim of a party seeking to47intervene permissively,46 as well as for a party joined under rule 20.

45. See, e.g., id. at 377 (" 'The policy of the [diversity] statute calls for its strict construction.' ") (quoting Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315
U.S. 442, 446 (1942); City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941);
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
46. Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 75, at 506-07 (1983). The requirement of
an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction for permissive intervention is not free
from confusion. First, there are exceptions to this requirement. See Spring Construction
Co. v. Harris, 614 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED1917 (1972 & Supp. 1981)) (suggesting that there are
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

exceptions to the general rule in instances such as class actions); Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d
947, 955 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

24.18[l] (2d ed. 1982)) (exceptions for class actions and for intervenors with an in rem interest in an in rem action).
There is authority contrary to the general rule in the cases that rest on Wichita R.R. &
Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922). The Supreme Court in Wichita
stated that "jurisdiction [is not] defeated by the intervention, by leave of the court, of a party
whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the original parties."
Id. at 54. Miller v. Miller, 406 F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1969), and United States v. Local 638,
Enter. Ass'n of Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), both cite Wichita as support
for their holdings that allow permissive intervention without an independent basis of subject
matter jurisdiction. Miller, 406 F.2d at 593 & n.10; Pipoetters, 347 F. Supp. at 167 & n.7 (if
the suit proposed to be initiated by the intervenor is "ancillary and dependent, the jurisdiction of the court follows that of the original cause, and may be maintained without regard to
the citizenship of the parties or the amount involved") (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 239 (1934)). However, while a permissive intervenor is clearly a party "whose
presence is not essential," Wichita was decided prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and recent Supreme Court decisions that restrict extension of subject
matter jurisdiction cast doubt on the validity of its holding. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370-73 (1978) (absent ancillary jurisdiction all claims must
be within the original jurisdiction of the federal court). Owen Equipment involved a nondiverse third-party defendant, but its reasoning logically can be extended to a permissive
intervenor who will also be unable to assert ancillary jurisdiction. Cf. Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1 (1976) (refusing to extend pendent jurisdiction over a party as to which no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction existed); 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note

21, § 1917 (fifiding Wichita Railroadno longer appropriate in light of modem procedure and
strictly limiting the case to its facts).
In Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89 (1969), the Supreme Court sustained a denial of
intervention partly because of the difficulties involved in the retention of jurisdiction over
the original action if complete diversity no longer existed. Id. at 96. Some commentators
have called for the extension of ancillary jurisdiction to all intervenors, thus removing the
requirement for an independent basis of'jurisdiction. See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 47374; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 760, 763-64.
47. See Reynolds v. Wabash R.R., 236 F.2d 387, 390 (8th Cir. 1956); Jacobs v. United
States, 367 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (D. Ariz. 1973) ("the discretion under [rule 20] to deny
joinder or to order severance of trial is itself an indication that the Court should not strain to
obtain jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist."); 3A MOORE's, supra note 11,
20.0711]; 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1659. Unlike the confusion of authority
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In the absence of a congressional or judicial exception, any action
based on diversity jurisdiction must satisfy the "complete diversity" requirement. 4 8 No such exception has been made for intervenors or parties joined under rule 20, so the citizenship of such49potential parties
must be diverse from that of all the adverse parties.
The Supreme Court requires strict application of the doctrine of
diversity jurisdiction.5 0 Applying all the preceding principles to the hypothetical case, it appears that the original Nevada plaintiff should not
be permitted to join the Oregon defendant, who is not diverse from the
intervenor, also a citizen of Oregon. The intervenor would be treated
as an original party and thus the joinder of the Oregon defendant
would offend the requirements of complete diversity. The plaintiff,
who chose this forum of limited jurisdiction, must abide by these
limits.5 '

Such a strict application of jurisdictional rules may place the hypothetical plaintiff in an untenable position. Requiring the original
plaintiff to join all potential parties prior to a possible intervention,
merely in order to ensure the continuing jurisdiction of the court in the
event of such intervention, is impractical in a dispute in which the identity of potential parties may not be ascertainable at the time suit is
brought. Conditioning the ability of a federal court to fully decide an

otherwise proper controversy on the citizenship of parties initially unknown, and perhaps unknowable until the proceedings are under way,
seems both unfair to the plaintiff and an inefficient use of judicial rewith respect to permissive intervention, see supra note 46, there is agreement that a party to
be permissively joined must have an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction.
48. The federal district courts have original jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982). One statutory requirement of diversity
jurisdiction is that all plaintiffs be diverse from all defendants. Owen Equip. & Erection Co.
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978) (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1969)).
Because such "complete diversity" is not a constitutional requirement, Congress may legislate a "minimum diversity" standard for certain actions, requiring only that one plaintiff be
diverse from one defendant. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,
530-31 (1967) (discussing the minimal diversity requirement in federal statutory interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(I), in which only one claimant need be diverse from one other
claimant). This power is extended in cases of "ancillary" and "pendent" jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court also has allowed the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction without complete
diversity in the absence of a contrary expression by Congress. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 18 (1976) (noting that ancillary and pendent jurisdiction may be asserted only when there
is no express or implied negation of its existence by Congress).
49. Adversity requires aligning the parties as plaintiffs and defendants. The denomination by the parties of their status is not determinative and the court will realign them to
match their adverse interets even if diversity jurisdiction is destroyed in the process. See City
of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 72-76 & nn. 3-4 (1941); Jet Traders Inv.
Corp. v. Tekair, Ltd., 89 F.R.D. 560, 566-67 (D. Del. 1981).
50. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978).
51. See supra note 22-24, 46 & accompanying text.
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sources. Such a practice could lead to aborted or incomplete adjudica-

tions and a multiplicity of suits, possibly resulting in inconsistent
judgments or a denial of recovery altogether. Such results are contrary
to the fundamental federal policy of promoting the "just, speedy, and

inexpensive" resolution of disputes.

A Procedural Solution
The plaintiff in the hypothetical case could retain control over
joinder of parties in the litigation under three circumstances. First, the
requirement of complete diversity could be changed through congres-

sional action or by judicial interpretation.5 2 Such changes have been

widely discussed, but there is no indication that they will be adopted by
Congress or the courts.:5 3 Second, the plaintiff could refile the action in
state court, thereby avoiding the diversity requirement. However, assuming the plaintiff filed in federal court for strategic reasons, this alternative is not desirable. Third, the plaintiff could use procedures
available under the existing federal rules to effect a just result. It is this
third alternative that offers the most practical approach for the plaintiff.
There are two procedures the federal district court may use 54 that
52. Changes in diversity requirements could increase the predictability of joinder in
multi-party disputes. Congress or the courts could modify the jurisdictional rules so that the
minimal diversity situation posed by the hypothetical would be sufficient. Alternatively,
minimal diversity could be used instead of complete diversity as the standard for general
civil litigation between parties of different states. See Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past,Present,and Future, 43 TEX. L. REv. 1, 27-29 (1964). Such a standard would
be constitutionally permissible, see U.S. CONST. art III, § 2; see also supranotes 48 & accompanying text, and it would be easily applicable since it requires only that one plaintiff be of
different citizenship than one defendant. However, such a change might have the undesirable effect of significantly increasing the caseload of the federal courts. Congress has not
expressed an interest in any such proposal.
A third possibility is the complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction, see Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and PotentialforFurtherReforms, 92 HARV.
L. Rnv. 963 (1979), which would eliminate many procedural problems. The plaintiff in the
hypothetical would only be able to file suit in state court. This approach would pare down
the caseload of the federal courts, leaving only cases involving federal questions. id. at 96970. This would be constitutionally permissible, since Congress has the power to grant or
deny jurisdictional authority to the lower courts. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
400-01 (1973); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922). The second and third
changes in diversity jurisdiction would avoid the convoluted procedural and jurisdictional
inquiry that must take place under the present rules governing procedures and standards for
diversity jurisdiction while allowing a direct, predictable procedural path to addressing the
controversy on its merits. However, it is not anticipated that either Congress or the courts
will implement any of these changes.
53. See supra note 52.
54. This Note assumes that the court does not have the option of ignoring the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction over the party to be joined. Cf. Fetzer v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 572
F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1978). The Fetzer court upheld the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court over an action involving two claims and nondiverse parties because one nondi-
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would avoid the jurisdictional problems resulting from permissive joinder of a nondiverse defendant and yet achieve a satisfactory result for
both the plaintiff and the intervenor.
The district court could sever the intervenor's claim from the origi55
nal action pursuant to the court's discretionary power under rule 21.
The court then could allow the plaintiff to join the defendant who was
not diverse from the intervenor and consolidate the plaintiff's action
action. Such consoliagainst the two defendants with the intervenor's
56
dation is permissible under rule 42(a).
Consolidation does not merge the actions 57; they retain their separate character but are brought together for purposes of judicial economy.5 8 While separate verdicts are required,5 9 joint hearings or trials

may be ordered 60 if judicial economy can be served without problems
62

such as jury confusion 6 or delay due to incomplete discovery.

verse party was dismissed to preserve complete diversity and because the trial court in effect
severed the two claims, thereby preserving diversity in each claim. Id. at 1253.
Any attempt to disregard subject matter jurisdiction could lead to reversal on appeal, as
subject matter jurisdiction may be questioned at any time by any party or by the court.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
55. Rule 21 provides in pertinent part that upon motion by a party or by the court's
own motion "[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately."
FED. R. Civ. P. 21. The Ninth Circuit has discussed how severance can be used to avoid
otherwise fatal jurisdictional problems. See Anrig v. Ringsby United, 603 F.2d 1319, 1325
(9th Cir. 1978).
56. Rule 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 42(a).

57. "[Clonsolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration, but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or
make those who are parties in one suit parties in another." Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289
U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933) (discussing consolidation practice before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), cited with approval in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 735 n.22 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also 9 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 21, § 2382.
58. See Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1973); Stein, Hall & Co. v.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 264 F. Supp. 499, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
59. "[T]he causes of action [remain] distinct, and [require] separate verdicts and judgments." Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 293 (1892) (discussion of consolidation practice under statutes prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
See also In re Massachusetts Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 469 F.2d 439, 441-42 (1st Cir. 1972).
60. The court "may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the
actions." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
61. See Molever v. Levenson, 539 F.2d 996, 1003 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024
(1976) ("Even as ultimately restricted, the proceedings lasted 15 days and absorbed over
4,500 transcribed pages of testimony. In light of such a plenitude of evidence, the jurors
would have had to be of uncommonly retentive minds to allocate proof among the four
separate claims.").
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The use of severance and then consolidation in the hypothetical
case would be particularly appropriate. Consolidation would satisfy

jurisdictional and procedural requirements, provide for joint hearings
for issues sharing common questions of law or fact 63 and deriving from
the same transaction or occurrence, 64 and yet avoid a single proceeding
for claims that are only loosely connected. 6 5 Consolidation would preserve the plaintiffs control over his suit without hindering other parties
from entering the dispute.
Severance and consolidation are also appropriate in this context
because the plaintiffs joinder motion will require satisfaction of both
the common question of law or fact requirement and the same transaction or occurrence requirement, 66 whereas the intervenor's claims only
need be linked to the action by the single and less stringent requirement of common question of law or fact. 67 Because the plaintiff's
claims might therefore be more closely connected than those of the intervenor, 68 and because the plaintff should be given broad power to
control his litigation, 69 the court should make liberal use of severance

and consolidation. However, this approach may not be appropriate if
it would work prejudice against the intervenor, who has become a full

party.70

Although such severance and consolidation may be no more than
procedural maneuvering to satisfy diversity jurisdiction, it is the approach most likely to produce trial efficiency and judicial economy, two
central concerns of the federal rules. 7 1 This efficiency is particularly
apparent when one considers discovery and appeals.
A number of rules governing discovery restrict parties to gathering
62. See La Chemise LaCoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 176 (D. Del. 1973) (consolidation denied where one case was close to trial and the other would require substantial
discovery to prepare it for trial).
63. This is a requirement of rule 42(a) and is paralelled in rule 20(a) and 24(b)(2).
64. This is a requirement of rule 20(a) but is not a requirement of rule 42(a). However,
any set of actions satisfying the same transaction or occurrence standard usually will have
common questions of law of fact. All of the claims in the hypothetical thus fall within the
ambit of the powers granted in rule 42(a), being linked by at least a common question of law
or fact.
65. See infra notes 72-75 & accompanying text.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). See supra note 11-12 & accompanying text.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). See supra note 25 & accompanying text.
68. The stronger the linkage between claims, the greater the preference for trying them
together. At one extreme, claims loosely linked, such as claims involved in permissive intervention, are allowed at the court's discretion, and the rights of the original parties must be
considered. See supra notes 7, 26 & accompanying text. At the other extreme are indispensable parties, who must be allowed into the action regardless of the rights of the original
parties because their presence is required for a "just adjudication." See supra note 11.
69. See supra notes 3-9 & accompanying text.
70. See supra note 41-43 & accompanying text.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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information from otherparies;72 in a consolidated proceeding, the parties to one action are not necessarily parties to the other action or actions, and thus may take advantage of these kinds of discovery only
against parties in their own action. For example, after a severance and
consolidation in the hypothetical case, the intervenor would only be
able to engage in discovery with the party that he asserted a claim
against: the original defendant. The original plaintiff would be able to
conduct discovery in a single action against both of the parties he asserted claims against, and the two defendants would be able to conduct
discovery against each other.73 This would serve judicial economy by
minimizing discovery burdens, 74 and would preserve the litigants' privacy interest by preventing an intervenor from conducting discovery
against a party that he either could not sue or has shown no interest in
suing.
A further benefit of using severance and consolidation is that appeals may be taken only from the separate actions. 75 As a result, the
plaintiff and the subsequently joined defendant need not be involved in
an appeal by the intervenor involving issues that are not of interest or
are against their interests. If separate appeals might cause judicial inef76
ficiency, the appellate court can hear and decide the appeals jointly.
A second procedural course is for the court to informally request
that the plaintiff file a separate action against the nondiverse party.
Upon motion of the plaintiff or sua sponte, the court would then consolidate the original action involving the plaintiff, the intervenor, and
the original defendant, with the new action between the plaintiff and
the defendant who is not diverse from the intervenor.
This choice is not as advantageous as the first in that it requires the
plaintiff to maintain two actions. The defendants are prohibited from
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (Trial Preparation: Experts); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (Discovery Conference); FED. R. Crv. P. 29 (Stipulations Regarding Discovery Procedure); FED. R.
Civ. P. 33 (Interrogatories to Parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (Production of Documents and
Things and Entry Upon Land Inspection and Other Purposes); FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (Physical
and Mental Examination of Person) (limited to parties- or persons in the custody of parties);
FED. R. Civ. P. 36 (Requests for Admission).
73. This result would be particularly advantageous when the defendants are jointly and
severally liable to the plaintiff, thus needing to conduct full discovery on each other.
74. Expense to the parties is a concern of judicial economy. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See,
e.g., Gonzalez v. Leonard, 497 F. Supp. 1058, 1077 (D. Conn. 1980) (permissive joinder);
Stein, Hall & Co. v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 264 F. Supp. 499, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(consolidation).
75. See, e.g., Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14, 16-17 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Massachusetts
Helicopter Airlines, Inc., 469 F.2d 439, 441-42 (1st Cir. 1972). See generally 6 MooRE's,
supra note 11 54.27[2]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 46, § 101, at 699-701.
76. The language of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) implies that separate
appeals from a consolidated proceeeding may themselves be heard and decided jointly. See
Davies v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 435, 436 (9th Cir. 1983) (considering five separate appeals
from a consolidated tax court action).
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engaging in certain types of discovery between themselves because they
are not parties to the same action and the intervenor is given access to
certain types of discovery against the plaintiff even though the intervenor has not chosen to sue the plaintiff. In addition, an appeal by the
intervenor is more likely to involve the original plaintiff because this
plaintiff would be a party in the intervenor's action.
If the court has failed to follow either of these courses, and has
granted permissive joinder without due concern for diversity, jurisdictional deficiencies may still be corrected by severing the claim lacking
subject matter jurisdiction 77 and consolidating the acindependent
78
tions.
Such severance and consolidation may be effected sua sponte
79
or at the court's discretion.
Conclusion
Federal subject matter jurisdiction based on complete diversity requires that no plaintiff in an action share citizenship with any defendant. In the context of permissive intervention and permissive joinder
this requirement may limit the plaintiff's control of the action, and
erect a barrier to the admission of parties who are not diverse, possibly
leading to judicial inefficiency and unfairness to the plaintiff. Although
the parties and the court are bound by jurisdictional requirements, the
court has the discretion to order such severance and consolidation as
would best serve judicial economy. Thus, when jurisdictional requirements limit the plaintiff's ability to join additional parties after a permissive intervention, the use of severance and consolidation should
allow a plaintiff to retain the control he or she desires without prejudicing the intervenor.
David C. Capell*

77. See supra note 55 & accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 55-58 & accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 55-56 & accompanying text.
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